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Though copyright protection in the United States is derived from the First
Article of the Constitution and is governed by statutes enacted by Congress under
that grant of power,' its limitations have more ambiguous origins. Often
dichotomized as internal and external,2 copyright limitations attempt to craft a
compromise between the financial incentive to create, which is secured by granting
authors the exclusive right to profit from their work, and the First Amendment free
speech rights of others to comment on, disseminate, and otherwise use these
copyrighted works. 3 Internal limitations, such as the idea-expression dichotomy
and the requirement that works be original and in a fixed medium, derive from the
Copyright Clause itself and define what can be protected.4 External limitations,
including those incorporated into copyright legislation, are imposed by other areas
of law and policy and immunize from liability uses that would otherwise be
considered infringements. 5
. B.A., Loyola College in Maryland (1997); M.A. (Philosophy), Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (2001);
J.D., Brooklyn Law School (2004). This Article was awarded first prize at Brooklyn Law School in the
65th Annual Nathan Burkan Memorial Copyright Competition sponsored by the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP). The Author would like to extend special thanks to
Professor Sammuel Munimba of Brooklyn Law School for his comments and suggestions on the
research and drafting of this Article.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101, etseq.
2. For a discussion of the "internal" and "external" restraints on copyright and their relation to
the First Amendment, see generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
3. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). See also Melville
B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192-93 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example of the Law of
Unintended Consequences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 240 (2001).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.").
5. See Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraints and Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust,
87 MiNN. L. REV. 1871, 1911 n.232 (2003).
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One such external limitation is the fair use doctrine. In the United States, fair
use is attributed to free speech principles found in the First Amendment 6 and,
despite its recent codification in the Copyright Act, remains a common law
equitable doctrine that judges apply on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis.7
Consequently, the types of uses protected are not specifically named or
enumerated, but are instead determined by considering several factors. While some
types of fair use are rather well recognized, others remain controversial.8 Recently,
the status of parody as a fair use has been the subject of much controversy, both
domestically and abroad.9
The European Community ("EC") has, on at least two occasions, expressed
concern that the United States' fair use doctrine immunizes from liability uses that
unjustifiably infringe authors' rights.' ° The EC has specifically argued that the
exception made for parodies under the fair use doctrine is not confined to "special
cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder,"" as required by
international agreements on copyright law. 12 While the United States has defended
the fair use doctrine and its protection of parodies as complying with such
agreements, some commentators have noted that, in doing so, the United States has
relied on a "less than accurate depiction of the fair use doctrine and how it operates
in domestic courts. '"13  Commentators have further concluded that the fair use
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (holding that
"copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations," including the fair use doctrine). It
should be noted that the fact that the fair use doctrine is said to derive from the First Amendment and
stands as an external limitation to copyright throws into question the oft-quoted remark, questioned
further infra at Part III, that copyright is the "engine of free speech." If this were really so, then all the
free speech protection necessary would be built in to the Copyright Clause itself and fair use would be a
superfluous doctrine. As this Article attempts to show, far from superfluous, fair use is indispensable.
7. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (noting that "fair use
remained exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act" and further,
that even after the passage of the 1976 Act, "[t]he task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for
the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis."). See also Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2004).
8. See e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable
Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, I J. IN'tELL. PROP. L. 49, 51 (1993)
("Fair use has historically served as a flexible and adaptable mechanism for balancing the interests of
copyright owners, their competitors or potential competitors, and the public to fulfill the larger purposes
of copyright law which have traditionally been understood to be promoting the production and
dissemination of knowledge.").
9. See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
75, 116-17 (2000).
10. See Council for TRIPs, Review of Legislation on Copyright and Related Rights - Replies to
Questions Posed to the United States by Brazil, the European Communities and Their Member States,
Australia and Korea, Oct. 30, 1996, WTO Doc. IP/QIUSA/I [hereinafter Review of Legislation].
11. Id. § IV, Replies to Questions Posed by the European Communities and Their Member States,
Question 1.
12. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods 33 I.L.M. 81, Dec. 15, 1993, art. 13 [hereinafter TRIPs].
13. Okediji, supra note 9, at 117.
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protections afforded to parodies in the United States would not survive a direct
challenge under Article 13 of the General Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs").
14
This Article argues that while there is certainly some variance between the
exceptions to copyright protection recognized in the United States and those
recognized by the international community, the particular charges the EC has
leveled at the United States are unwarranted and their concerns misplaced. This
Article further argues that, at least as it has been enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court ("Supreme Court"), the fair use doctrine regarding parodic uses
does not conflict with the legitimate interests enshrined in TRIPs. What it does
provide, and what may seem foreign to some in the international community, is
traditional free speech protections. These protections prohibit copyright owners
from removing from the public discourse speech that adversely affects the value of
their property only to the extent that it is critical of that property. Such protection
is necessary to ensure that the "marketplace of ideas" remains open and
competitive, that copyright law continues to balance the financial incentives of
authors to create and the rights of others to comment, and that copyright does not
revert to its nefarious origins as a form of censorship.' 5
Part I will survey the current state of fair use in the United States, with
particular attention to exceptions made for parodic works. Part II will explore the
treatment of copyright exceptions under TRIPs. It will also review the specific
criticisms the EC has raised concerning the United States' fair use doctrine,
particularly with regard to parody, and evaluate the defenses the United States has
offered in response. This section will also suggest that the United States'
responses were unnecessarily evasive, and that the protection of parodic works
could have been defended on the merits.
Part III will show that the use of copyright to "horizontally" censor works-
that is, to remove from the public discourse works that are critical of the copyright
holder's property-is not a "normal exploitation" and does not protect a
"legitimate interest," as those terms are defined under TRIPs.16 This argument will
be further buttressed by reviewing two United States Court of Appeals copyright
cases decided since the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the status
of parody under the fair use doctrine. Part IV will conclude by observing that
recent developments in EC copyright law suggest that something like a free speech
exception to copyright may be emerging. While it is too early to know what form
such an exception will take, it would be surprising if it did not protect uses that
harm the original only by criticizing it, just as the fair use doctrine in the United
States does today.
14. See, e.g., Okediji, supra note 9, at 117; Rosemary J. Coombe, Fear, Hope, and Longingfor the
Future of Authorship and a Revitalized Public Domain in Global Regimes of Intellectual Property, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 1171, 1183 (2003).
15. Okediji, supra note 9, at 82.
16. See TRIPs, supra note 12, art. 13.
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I. FAIR USE AND PARODY IN THE UNITED STATES
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court was asked to determine
whether a rap parody of Roy Orbison's song "Pretty Woman" was an infringement
of the copyright in that song.17 The defendants conceded that their use of the song
was an infringement; however, they argued that the use was a parody and
therefore, protected as a fair use of the original.18 To decide if the rap version was
in fact such a fair use, the Court looked to the four factors which the Copyright Act
requires be considered in determining fair use.19 However, the Court also made
clear that these factors should not be treated as establishing bright-line rules;
indeed, despite its codification in the Copyright Act, fair use essentially remains an
equitable doctrine, informed by free speech principles and decided on a case-by-
case basis. 20 Consequently, the Court emphatically rejected the analysis of the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which had held that a finding under the first
factor, ("purpose and character") that the use was commercial in nature was nearly
dispositive in its determination that the parody was not a fair use.2' The Court of
Appeals relied on language in the Supreme Court's previous decision in Sony
Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc., indicating that "every commercial
use of copyrighted material is presumptively... unfair ... ,22 Observing that
such a presumption would "swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the
preamble paragraph of § 107" of the Copyright Act,23 the Supreme Court reiterated
that no such presumption was created by Sony; a work's commercial nature is only
24one element of the first factor inquiry into the use's purpose and character.
The Court of Appeals' erroneous prioritization of the commercial nature
inquiry also affected its analysis of the fourth statutory factor, "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work., 25 The Court of
Appeals relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Harper & Row v. Nation
Enterprises to conclude that the fourth factor was "undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use. 26 The Court of Appeals went on to reason that
because the use was wholly commercial, they could "presume that a likelihood of
future harm to Acuff-Rose exist[ed]. 27
17. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1994).
18. Id. at 574.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004) ("(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.").
20. A cuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 577.
21. Id. at 584.
22. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
23. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 584.
24. Id.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2004).
26. Acuff-Rose Music v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)).
27. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (citing Acuff-Rose Music v.
Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992)).
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The Supreme Court noted that the language from Sony on which the Court of
Appeals relied concerned commercial uses that were verbatim duplications of the
original.28 In such circumstances, it is reasonable to presume that this duplicative
use will act as a market replacement for the original, and thus will harm the market
for the original. However, this is not the case where, as in Acuff-Rose, the use is
transformative. 29 "The central purpose of [the first factor inquiry] is to see...
whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects.., or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message.,, 30 In the latter case, "the parody and the
original usually serve different market functions," and so harm must be proven, not
presumed.3 ' The Court was clear that this does not mean that parody will never
harm the market for the original (or, as is more likely, for derivative works);
indeed, the Court remanded the case for further evidence to be heard specifically
on whether the market for derivative works had been harmed by the parody. 2
This distinction is extremely important for the present discussion. The
Court's holding excluded from consideration under the fourth factor any harm to
the market caused merely by the parodic work's critical nature. It likened such
harm to that which might be inflicted by a scathing book review or other criticism
of a work.33 Indeed, the distinction between "potentially remediable displacement
and unremediable disparagement is reflected in the rule that there is no protectible
derivative market for criticism., 34 Such critical uses unquestionably fall under the
fair use exception. To hold otherwise would be to allow copyright holders to use
their property rights to quell criticism and unfavorable commentary about their
works.
Equally important for this discussion is the Court's treatment of its previous
determination in Harper & Row that the fourth factor was "undoubtedly the single
most important element of fair use., 35 While the Court, in Acuff-Rose, quoted this
language in its procedural history of the case,36 it never evaluated this position in
its specific discussion of the fourth factor. This silence left open the question of
whether the fourth factor actually took priority over the others. Commentary has
suggested that the Court's analysis in Acuff-Rose actually elevated the first factor,
the purpose and character of the use, over the others and diminished the
importance of the fourth factor, the degree to which the use harms the market for
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 579 (internal citations omitted).
31. Id. at 591 (citing Bisceglia, Parody and Copyright Protection: Turning the Balancing Act Into
a Juggling Act, in ASCAP, COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOsIuM, No. 34, p. 23 (1987)).
32. Id. at 594.
33. Id. at 591-92.
34. Id. at 592.
35. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)).
36. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994).
37. Id. at 590-94.
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the original.38 Evidence for this theory can be found in the degree to which the
Court diminished the role of market harm, in the Court's insistence that this factor
be considered along with and balanced against the other factors, 39 and the Court's
treatment of the transformative nature of the use as counterbalancing the
commercial nature of the use.4 ° While it is true that the transformative nature of
the use did affect the Court's determination that market harm needed to be proven,
the claim that this elevated the first element above the others goes too far. Had the
use been a verbatim commercial use, market harm would have been presumed,
giving rise to the appearance that the fourth, not the first, factor had carried the
day. Instead, it seems fair to say that no one of the factors enjoys dispositive or
even controlling power in all cases. True to the Supreme Court's repeated
insistence that fair use be determined on a "case-by-case" basis, 41 the factor that
proves most important will depend on the type of use in question.
For parodic works, however, it does appear that the analysis will center on the
fourth factor. If a parody usurps the market for the original or derivatives thereof,
that parody is less likely to be deemed a fair use.42 If the parody does not usurp the
market, but harms the original only by lampooning it, the use will likely be
considered fair. The failure to make this essential distinction is at the root of the
EC's discontent with the United States' fair use exception for parodies; it is to this
discontent that we now tuM.
43
II. THE INTERNATIONAL RECEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES FAIR USE DOCTRINE
Article 13 of TRIPs provides that "Members shall confine limitations or
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder."44 This provision has been construed to incorporate
38. See generally Elizabeth Troup Timkovich, The New Significance of the Four Fair Use Factors
as Applied to Parody: Interpreting the Court's Analysis in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 TUL.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 61 (2003).
39. Id. at 69 (noting that the fourth factor "varies with the strength of the other factors").
40. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 591.
41. Id. at 581.
42. Id. at 592.
43. It should also be noted that the second factor, the nature of the work, is rarely given much
attention, especially in parody cases, and is likewise largely ignored in the present Article. See, e.g.,
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 1175 (spending only one paragraph on the factor and noting that this factor is
not likely to be much help in "separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case,
since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works."). See also Dr. Suess Enters.,
L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F. 3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing the factor in only
one paragraph and observing, "While this factor typically has not been terribly significant in the overall
fair use balancing, the creativity, imagination and originality embodied in the [copyrighted work at
issue] and its central character tilts the scales against fair use."). We will return to the decision in Dr.
Suess below, infra Part III. On the other hand, the third factor, the "amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole," has played an important role in fair use
decisions. However, it is also largely ignored in the present discussion, as it is subsumed in the
discussion of market competition, i.e., whether the parody competes with the copyrighted work.
44. TRIPs, supra note 12, art. 13 (emphasis added).
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and subsume the exceptions granted in the Berne Convention,4 5 and therefore
represents the controlling language for disputes regarding exceptions under
international copyright law.46 This discussion of the United States' fair use
doctrine will, therefore, focus on U.S. conformity with these provisions.
There have been two major challenges to the United States' fair use doctrine
under international copyright law. In 1996, the World Trade Organization
("WTO") submitted the copyright laws of the United States to a Review of
Legislation on Copyright and Related Rights ("Review of Legislation") in order to
ensure that they were compliant with TRIPs.47 While many of the questions
presented to the United States concerned recent amendments to the United States
Copyright Act (the "Copyright Act") affecting the right of performance, the EC
questioned how treatment of parody as a fair use exception to copyright (as the
Supreme Court had done in Acuff-Rose) could be squared with Article 13 of
TRIPs.48 Then, in 2000, a Panel was convened by the Dispute Settlement Body of
the WTO to hear a complaint brought by the EC against the United States
regarding Section 106 of the Copyright Act.49 While that Section does not address
parody, the dispute did give the Panel the opportunity to interpret for the first time
the terms of Article 13, which governs exceptions to copyright protection. The
WTO Panel discussion will, therefore, be useful in predicting how such a panel
would decide an outright challenge to the fair use exception for parody.
A. The Review of Legislation
While other nations posed questions regarding various aspects of recent
amendments to the Copyright Act, the EC asked the United States how the fair use
doctrine, codified at Section 107 of the Act, complies with the provisions of TRIPs
Article 13, particularly with regard to "a 'parody' that diminishes the value of a
work." 50 The EC's question seems to imply that any use that would diminish the
value of the work for any reason would be impermissible under TRIPs. This,
however, is not the case. Article 13 provides that "[m]embers shall confine
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the right holder." 5' Thus, there may be cases which do
diminish the value of the work but which do not conflict with the normal
exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
right holder. The specific meaning of the terms of Article 13, and how it would
treat such cases, will be addressed below with respect to the Panel Report.
In response to the EC's question, the United States argued that fair use
45. WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
WT/DSI60/R (June 15, 2000), paras. 6.92-6.96, available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter WTO
Panel Report].
46. Id.
47. Review of Legislation, supra note 10.
48. Id. § iv.
49. WTO Panel Report, supra note 45.
50. Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV.
51. TRIPs, supra note 12, art. 13 (emphasis added).
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"embodies essentially the same goals as Article 13" and that the doctrine protects
only "those types of uses which do not interfere with the copyright owner's normal
exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice his or her rights." 52 Echoing
the Supreme Court's decision in Acuff-Rose, the United States offered the example
of a scathing book review, which certainly may diminish the value of the work, but
would not infringe the copyright unless it "substitute[d] for purchases of the book
in the marketplace. 53 After delineating the four factors that courts will consider in
determining a fair use, the United States asserted that "[tihe Supreme Court has
stated that the fourth factor, which specifically focuses on the impact of potential
market exploitation of the work, is the most important" and cited to the Court's
decision in Harper & Row.54  It went on to note that other factors may be
considered as well, allowing for flexibility and case-by-case analyses.55
As noted above, the Acuff-Rose Court did not address whether the fourth
factor was in fact the most important. 6 While the United States' representation of
this issue is therefore not exactly inaccurate, it could be considered misleading,
especially if one follows either the argument that in Acuff-Rose it was the first
factor that carried the day or that no factor is controlling in all cases.57 Instead of
being evasive, the United States could have argued that TRIPs, by the plain
language of Article 13, does not forbid any exception that would "diminish the
value of the work," but instead lays out a three-part test for deciding if a use is
impermissible.5 8 While the fourth factor addresses market harm, the other factors,
and particularly the first factor's consideration of whether the use is
transformative, act to guard against such unreasonable market uses. Were Article
13 to forbid all value-diminishing uses, as the EC would have it, this would serve
to quell all but "flattering commentary or benign parody," as the United States did
eventually retort.5 9
Regarding parody specifically, the United States asserted that not all parodies
are protected by fair use; only "true parody" which targets and comments on the
copyrighted work (as opposed to satire, which only uses the copyrighted work as a
vehicle to comment on some other target
6") will be afforded this protection.
61
Further, even a true parody will not be deemed to be a fair use if the fourth factor
weighs against it, that is, if the parody "replaces any desire to exploit the copyright
work., 62 The EC was less than satisfied with this response, fearing that because a
parody could use a greater part of a copyrighted work than a simple review; such a




56. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590-94 (1994).
57. See Timkovich, supra note 38, at 68; see discussion Part I, supra.
58. Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV.
59. Id.
60. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580 n.14.
61. Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV.
62. Id.
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use could conflict with the "normal exploitation of the work. 63 The United States'
reply was, again, simply that the fourth factor would weigh against such a use.
64
Inexplicably, although the United States addressed both sides of the harm
issue, it never explicitly made the distinction made in Acuff-Rose between harming
the market for the copyrighted work (or derivatives thereof) by simply criticizing
the work and harming the market by usurping it.65 Indeed, the United States
adopted the language first used by the EC as to whether a parody would "replace
any desire to exploit the copyright work." 66 This language is not used anywhere in
Article 13 and serves only to conflate this important distinction. Indeed, the
scathing book review would certainly quell, if not extinguish, the "desire to
exploit," but this use would fall within Article 13. The United States' response
therefore appeared evasive and less truthful than it could have been had it made
this distinction, one that the Supreme Court had already made in Acuff-Rose and
that the WTO Panel itself would make just four years later.
B. The Panel Report
In 2000, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body convened a Panel to hear a
complaint brought by the EC against the United States regarding Section 106 of
the Copyright Act.67 Recent amendments had created exceptions to the exclusive
right of performance to allow certain businesses to perform copyrighted works
publicly. The United States argued in response to the complaint that such uses are,
in fact, covered under the exceptions of TRIPs Article 13. While the use at issue
was not one of parody, the Panel Report is the only occasion the WTO has had
thus far to construe the meaning of Article 13. By reviewing the arguments and
decision in this dispute, one can glean some indication as to how the WTO would
settle a dispute concerning parodic fair use, such as was the subject of the Review
of Legislation.
The Panel broke the Article 13 provisions into three distinct tests: the
exception must (1) be confined to certain special cases; (2) not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work; and (3) not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder.68 We will deal with each condition in turn.
1. "Confined to certain special cases "
Regarding the first condition, the Panel concluded that for an exception to be
"confined to certain special cases," it should be "clearly defined" and "narrow in
its scope and reach." 69 In so finding, the Panel rejected arguments put forth by the
EC that the "certain special cases" should also serve a "special purpose., 70 The
Panel agreed with the U.S. response that TRIPs does not require or even allow the
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 591-92.
66. Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV.
67. WTO Panel Report, supra note 45, paras. 1.1-1.8.
68. Id. para. 6.97.
69. Id. paras. 6.112-13.
70. Id. paras. 6.102,6.105.
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Panel to pass judgment on the legitimacy of domestic policy objectives "in light of
[each country's] own history and national priorities.,, 71 Further, the Panel found
that although the exception must be "clearly defined," there is "no need to identify
explicitly each and every possible situation to which the exception could apply.,
72
Considering what these findings would mean for a challenge to the United
States' fair use exceptions for parodic works, two main points overlap. First, it
should be comforting to the United States that the Panel will not pass judgment on
the legitimacy of the policy underlying the exception. Fair use generally, and
parody in particular, rely on free speech principles, and it would be unfortunate
indeed if the United States was called upon to justify free speech to the Panel and
other member states that do not have such a tradition in their domestic laws.
However, one could argue that when judges review a particular use, the more
attenuated the relationship between the parody and the targeted work, the stronger
the likelihood of an infringement. 73 In Acuff-Rose, the Court defined parody as a
"commentary" on the targeted work and found that the use at issue there
"reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to
some degree. 74 The determination of whether a use does comment or criticize
enough to be considered a parody thus appears to be an almost aesthetic and
potentially political judgment. This alone may cause worry regarding the potential
for censorship.75 However, if this judgment were then reviewable by a WTO Panel
which could further determine if the work was "critical enough," the specter of
international censorship would be hard to avoid.76
Second, it is important to evaluate the argument that parody is not "clearly
defined" enough to comport with the first condition. The Court in Acuff-Rose
implied that a parody, which targets the original work, could be protected under
fair use while a satire, which uses the work as a vehicle to criticize some other
work, genre or society at large, would not be protected.77 While this distinction
between use as a "target" and use as a "weapon" creates the illusion of a clear
definition of what parodies would be protected, it is a dubious distinction at best.
Though satire does tend to use the original work as a weapon to criticize some
other target, the weapon rarely survives unscathed; it too will be lampooned, if
only by association. 7' A further justification offered for this distinction is that
71. Id. paras. 6.106, 6.112.
72. Id. para. 6.108.
73. Ellen Gredley & Spyros Maniatis, Parody: A Fatal Attraction? Part 1: The Nature of Parody
and its Treatment in Copyright, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 339, 343 (1997).
74. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
75. This topic will be discussed in greater detail below, see infra at Part IlI.
76. Furthermore, unfavorable treatment by the WTO with regard to such deeply-held values could
increase the risk of "regime-shifting," that is, the United States' moving the issue into an institution
where a more favorable result is more likely. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional
Theory ofInternational Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679, 724 n.139 (2003) (discussing "regime shifting").
77. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 581, nn. 14-15. See also Michael Rushton, Copyright and Freedom of
Expression: An Economic Analysis, in COPYRIGHT IN THE CULTURAL INDUSTRIEs 58 (Ruth Towse ed.,
2002).
78. Jason M. Vogel, The Cat in the Hat's Latest Bad Trick: The Ninth Circuit's Narrowing of the
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while the parodist can justify his or her use of the original work (it being necessary
to conjure up the work in order to criticize it), the satirist uses the work merely as a
weapon. It is thus argued that because the satirist chooses this weapon from
amongst many possible others, there is no justification for using this one in
particular.79
This argument is unsustainable for at least three reasons. First, there may be
cases where there is simply no other satisfactory weapon.80 To imply otherwise,
that is, to suggest that the artist should use some other work, is to dictate the
creative process to the artist, a practice in which neither judges nor plaintiffs
should involve themselves. 8' Second, if every owner of a potential 'weapon' has
this excuse, no satire will ever be authored.82 Finally, because the proposed use
will almost invariably reflect poorly on the 'weapon' as well, it is unlikely that any
copyright owner would allow for it.
83
The discretion afforded to judges in deciding what qualifies as a parody is
therefore of some concern in relation to parodic fair uses under Article 13."
However, this concern only follows from the belief that we have a "fair use regime
based on the parody/satire dichotomy." 85  In fact, this is an entirely false
dichotomy. The mere categorization of a work as a parody does not automatically
qualify it as a fair use. 86 The Acuff-Rose Court specifically held that "parody, like
any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged case
by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law."87
Therefore, the only point of concern in deciding whether parody is "clearly
defined" for the purposes of Article 13 will be the fact that there is no real way to
predict how judges will interpret the specific facts of each and every case.
However, the Panel explicitly held that there was "no need to identify explicitly
each and every possible situation to which the exception could apply. 88 Further,
the unpredictability of judges is inherent in the judicial process, and though it may
be a point of concern, it is certainly no basis for ruling that this particular doctrine
fails to comport with the "clearly defined" standard. It is therefore suggested that
the fair use exception for parody ought to survive the first standard.
Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement in Dr. Suess Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 313 (1998).
79. Gredley & Maniatis, supra note 73, at 343.
80. Id.
81. Vogel, supra note 78, at 312-313.
82. Id. at 313.
83. Id. at 314.
84. Id. at 313 ("Thus, an essential weakness of the a fair use regime based on the parody/satire
dichotomy is that, by defining parody broadly or narrowly, courts can subjectively accord or deny fair
use to an alleged parodic work.").
85. Id.
86. Id. at 288-290.
87. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994).
88. WTO Panel Report, supra note 45, para. 6.108.
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2. "Not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work"
The Panel next interpreted what constitutes "normal exploitation" for
purposes of the second standard of Article 13. The Panel first noted that the
"normal exploitation" of a work could not mean the full use of all exclusive rights
conferred, since this would leave Article 13 "devoid of meaning. ' '89 Thus, the
Panel decided that "normal" use is not full use but instead has an empirical aspect
and a normative (or dynamic) aspect. 90 Regarding the empirical aspect, the Panel
accepted the United States' suggestion that the inquiry look to "whether there are
areas of the market in which the copyright owner would ordinarily expect to
exploit the work, but which are not available for exploitation because of this
exemption."91 Regarding the normative or dynamic aspect, the Panel suggested a
forward-looking formulation that should consider "forms of exploitation which,
with a certain degree of likelihood and plausibility, could acquire considerable
economic or practical importance.' 92
However, the Panel also made clear that "not every use of a work, which in
principle is covered by the scope of exclusive rights and involves commercial gain,
necessarily conflicts with a normal exploitation of that work., 93 All together, the
Panel thus held that a use conflicts with a normal exploitation of a copyrighted
work if it "enter[s] into economic competition with the ways that right holders
normally extract economic value from that right to the work (i.e., the copyright)
and thereby deprive[s] them of significant or tangible commercial gains., 94 It is
important to note that the deprivation of commercial gains must be a consequence
of the challenged work competing with the copyrighted work. This explicitly
rejects the EC's position in the Review of Legislation that any use which
"replace[s] any desire to exploit the copyright work" violates Article 13. The
Panel's language indicates that not every use that would replace the desire to
exploit (and therefore deprive the owner of significant or tangible commercial
gains) would violate Article 13, but only those which do so through competition.
Mirroring the observation in Acuff-Rose that "parody and the original usually serve
different market functions," 96 the Panel seems to have concluded that only when
the parody usurps the market for the original work would there be a conflict with
this provision of Article 13. Indeed, ceteris paribus, it is also only in such a case
that it would run afoul of fair use in the United States.
89. Id. para. 6.167.
90. Id. para. 6.166.
91. Id. paras. 6.177, 6.178.
92. Id. para. 6.180.
93. Id. para. 6.182.
94. Id. para. 6.183 (emphasis added).
95. Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV.
96. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (citing Bisceglia, Parody and
Copyright Protection: Turning the Balancing Act Into a Juggling Act, COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP),
No. 34, p. 23 (1987)).
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3. "Not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder"
The Panel then set to interpreting the final standard of Article 13. Since the
parties and the Panel agreed that a copyright owner exercising his or her rights for
economic gain would be a "legitimate interest," the Panel centered its investigation
on the question of what degree of prejudice would be unreasonable.97 Considering
the importance of this factor, the Panel gave it comparably short shrift.98 It rather
summarily concluded that "prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right holders
reaches an unreasonable level if an exception or limitation causes or has the
potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner." 99 In so
doing, it left open several issues, not the least of which was when a loss of income
becomes unreasonable. Essentially, the Panel reduced "legitimate interest" to
"income," which in itself raises questions, 1' ° and shifted the "reasonableness"
standard from the prejudice to the loss of income. In fact, the Panel's analysis of
the controversy in front of it did little to answer this question. It only decided that
it would consider the present and potential market conditions that may affect the
copyright holder's income. 10 1 A parody's effect on the market for the original will
be considered, but it is difficult to predict what level of effect would be necessary
to find an infringement.
10 2
To summarize the holdings of the Panel Report, a use will fall within the
exceptions of Article 13 if the use falls within a clearly defined category, does not
enter into competition with the copyrighted work, and does not cause unreasonable
loss of income to the owner of the copyrighted work. 10 3 It should be noted that that
the latter two clauses could become redundant with regard to parody. If an
infringing parodic work does not compete with the copyrighted work, no loss of
income, however great, could be considered unreasonable. This conclusion is
borne out by the familiar "scathing book review" standard: it is possible that a
review could be so devastating that income would drop off to nothing. Yet, this
would not, under the second factor, be an infringement. Therefore, the three
standards collapse into two, at least for parody. The exception must be clearly
defined and it must not protect uses that cause unreasonable loss of income to the
owner of the copyrighted work through competition. Thus phrased, the central
97. WTO Panel Report, supra note 45, para. 6.226.
98. Id. paras. 6.226, 6.227.
99. Id. para. 6.229.
100. For example, is the Panel implying that an author's interests in her work are solely financial
and do not include reputational or moral rights, and thereby embracing the American utilitarian view of
copyright instead of the European natural rights view? These competing views are discussed infra at
Part IV, but whether the Panel is in fact making such a choice is an open question outside the scope of
the present article but properly and hopefully the subject of further scholarship.
101. WTO Panel Report, supra note 45, paras. 6.236, 6.249.
102. Id. It might also be observed that interpretations of what is "reasonable," which would depend
greatly on the facts of particular disputes, including, e.g., the type of works in question and relevant
market conditions, would cause no less uncertainty or unpredictability than would the determination of
whether a parody is a fair use in the United States. It is therefore doubtful that this reasonableness
standard would survive the Panel's own "clearly defined" standard if the four-part fair use inquiry in the
United States would not, as the EC had suggested. See discussion, supra at II.B. 1.
103. Id. para. 7.1.
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question becomes: When is a use competition and when is it criticism? The
answer would be decisive in a Panel review of the U.S. fair use doctrine. It is to
that question we now turn.
III. HORIZONTAL EFFECT, PRIVATE CENSORSHIP AND FREE SPEECH
The relationship between copyright law and free speech in the United States
has been the subject of much scholarly debate for many years.'10 4 While the official
position has been that the two live together harmoniously, with copyright being the
"engine of free expression,"10 5 many have noted that there is often more tension
than the official "no-conflict narrative" admits. 10 6 Considering copyright's origin
as a means of censorship,'0 7 there has been concern that the disturbing
phenomenon known as the "horizontal effect"' 8 is really a new means of
censorship, albeit in a privately administered form. 0 9 If copyright holders are able
to use their rights to keep expression out of the public discourse solely because it is
critical of their work, this will be a means of censorship as effective, if less wide
ranging, as was the English Stationer's Guild."0
For example, in the case of Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the holder
of the copyright in the novel and movie Gone With The Wind sued to enjoin the
publication of a novel titled, The Wind Done Gone, which was a parody based on
and using many of the characters, plot, and setting of the original work."' The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refused to issue an injunction, finding
that any harm could be addressed by monetary damages and that "it appear[ed] a
viable fair use defense [was] available."'" 2 In so doing, the court had occasion to
review the four fair use factors provided in Section 107 of the Copyright Act.
Regarding market harm, the court was persuaded by evidence proffered that
"demonstrate[d] why [The Wind Done Gone was] unlikely to displace sales of
[Gone With the Wind]."'"l 3 Essential in coming to this conclusion was the court's
reiteration of the Acuff-Rose Court's observation that:
104. For a history of this relationship and an argument that there is less harmony in the relationship
than is traditionally found, seePamela Samuelson, Copyright, Commodification, and Censorship: Past
as Prologue - But to What Future?, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 63 (Niva Elkin-Koren
& Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002). See also Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free
Speech Affair: Making-Up and Breaking-Up, 43 IDEA 233 (2003).
105. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
106. Michael D. Bimhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1275, 1280 (2003) (noting recent challenges to the "no-conflict narrative").
107. Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the
Public Domain Part 1,18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 193, 236 (1993).
108. Michael D. Birnhack, Acknowledging the Conflict Between Copyright Law and Freedom of
Expression under the Human Rights Act, 14 ENT. L.R. 2003, 24 [hereinafter, Bimhack, Acknowledging
the Conflict] (questioning the horizontal effect in the context of private rights of action under the United
Kingdom's Human Rights Act of 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950).
109. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
110. See Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 323 (2003).
111. SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259.
112. Id. at 1277.
113. Id. at 1275.
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[t]he only harm to [derivative markets] that need concern us... is the harm of
market substitution. The fact that a parody may impair the market for derivative
uses by the very effectiveness of its critical commentary is no more relevant
under copyright than the like threat to the original market." 4
Interestingly, in determining that the derivative market would not likely be
harmed, the court noted that while the owners of the Gone With the Wind copyright
forbade licensees from making any reference to homosexuality, The Wind Done
Gone cast Rhett Butler, one of the main characters, as a homosexual." 5 This made
it certain that the parody and any licensed derivatives of the original would "serve
different market functions."'" 6 In a speech given shortly after the decision in
SunTrust, Joseph Beck, lead counsel for the parodist, noted that the copyright
holder had not objected to dozens of other parodies made of Gone With the Wind,
because those had been flattering and had "reinforce[d] the iconographic stature of
Gone With the Wind. [The Wind Done Gone] does not reinforce the iconographic
stature of Gone With the Wind, and that is why it was attacked."
'" 7
This case points out the danger that copyright, rather than being the "engine
of free expression," could revert to a means of private censorship. Copyright
owners could use their exclusive rights to silence voices that are critical of their
work. Both the Supreme Court and the WTO Panel have decided to guard against
such abuse by allowing fair use of copyrighted material without permission so long
as that use does not cause harm to the market for the original or derivatives thereof
through competition.' 1s
However, the formulation of permissible exceptions that the EC presented in
the Review of Legislation and in front of the WTO Panel, which would forbid any
use that "replace[s] any desire to exploit the copyright work," would not be able to
discriminate between prohibited harm through competition and immunized harm
through criticism." 9 In the case of The Wind Done Gone, profits from sales and
derivatives of Gone With the Wind would be diminished if the parody created a
popular backlash against the latter's glorification of Southern plantation society.
However, this should not be the type of harm against which copyright can be used
to protect an author. To do so would be to allow the private censorship that
copyright is supposed to avoid.'
20
A good example of how the failure to make this distinction can result in
private censorship is Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Book USA, Inc.'2' The
owners of the copyright in The Cat in the Hat sued to enjoin the publication of The
Cat NOT in the Hat!, a book which retold the story of the O.J. Simpson double
114. Id. at 1274 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994)).
115. Id. at 1271 n.26.
116. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 591.
117. Joseph Beck, Flexibility in Parody of Copyrighted Material, 10 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 3, 13
(2002).
118. SeeAcuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590; Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV..
119. Review of Legislation, supra note 10, § IV.
120. SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1263.
121. Dr. Suess Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
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homicide trial using the style of the copyrighted work. 122 Working its way through
the Section 107 factors, the court found that the use was not a protected fair use,
and therefore allowed the injunction.
123
Regarding the first factor, the court found that the work was not sufficiently
transformative because it adopted the copyrighted work's style only "'to get
attention' and maybe even 'to avoid the drudgery in working up something
fresh.""124 Furthermore, the court found that the use was not in fact a parody, but
only a satire, using the copyrighted work as a weapon against an external target:
the O.J. Simpson trial. 25 Because the court found that the commentary had no
"critical bearing on the substance or style" of the copyrighted work, 126 under the
distinction made in Acuff-Rose, this would indeed appear to be a satire. The book
uses the comical and farcical setting of The Cat In The Hat to imply that the 0. J.
Simpson trial was also comical and farcical. It is true that The Cat In The Hat was
not targeted, but was rather used as a weapon. It is also true that "the good will" of
The Cat In The Hat may suffer from the association with the double homicide.
However, being cast in a less-than-appealing light is no basis for claiming
copyright infringement: it was not sufficient in Harper & Row and it should not
have been sufficient here. This is apparent in light of the court's fourth factor
analysis.
The court observed that in weighing the fourth factor they should consider
both "the extent of market harm caused by the publication and distribution of The
Cat NOT in the Hat! and whether its unrestricted and widespread dissemination
would hurt the potential market for the original and derivatives of The Cat In The
Hat.'' 127 Instead of relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Acuff-Rose, where
the distinction between harm by usurpation and harm by criticism was made
explicit, 128 the Ninth Circuit inexplicably chose to rely on language from a non-
binding, pre-Acuff-Rose, Second Circuit decision which characterized the fourth
factor inquiry as:
[Striking a balance] between the benefit the public will derive if the use is
permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is
denied. The less adverse effect that an alleged infringing use has on the
copyright owner's expectation of gain, the less public benefit need be shown to
justify the use.
129
This analysis not only flies in the face of the binding, subsequent Supreme
Court decision in Acuff-Rose, it also substantially echoes the position of the EC in
122. Id. at 1396.
123. Id. at 1403.
124. Id. at 1401 (citing Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1403.
128. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (upholding the "distinction
between potentially remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement").
129. Dr. Suess Enters., L.P., 109 F.3d at 1403 (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
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the Review of Legislation and Panel Report. Specifically, the discussion is only of
the "adverse effect" on the copyright owner's "expected gain," without any
distinction made as to how this adverse effect comes about.' 30 To return to our
tired example of the scathing book review, this analysis would find infringement if
the review caused sales to drop off unless the review had some overwhelming
public benefit. While the merits of such a policy could be debated, it is enough to
observe that this balancing test appears nowhere in the Supreme Court's decisions
on fair use and does not represent the applicable law on the issue.
Further, it is from this analysis and without any evidence of actual market
conditions that the court summarily concluded that because the use was
"nontransformative, and admittedly commercial... market substitution is at least
more certain, and market harm may be more readily inferred.' 13' However, the
court's own analysis seems contradictory. First, if the only harm is to the "good
will and reputation," and this harm stems from the bad light in which the work is
cast, this would be no grounds for denying fair use. 132 The harm would have to
come from competition with the original, and so we can assume that the "adverse
effect" mentioned above 133 must derive from that competition. However, if the
parodic use is such that it would harm the original merely by association, how
could it also be maintained that the parody would compete with the original or
derivatives thereof? Would not this be a case where the parody and the original
almost certainly "serve different market functions?"'' 34 Further, if the use is so
harmful to the original, can we be expected to believe there is a derivative market
for it that the copyright holder would have exploited but which is being usurped by
the parody? Certainly, a court should at least require evidence of such a rare'
situation should one be alleged to exist.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's analysis flies in the face of the Supreme Court's
decision in Acuff-Rose, undercuts the very policy behind the fair use protection of
parody, and has not gone uncriticized.' 35 In fact, it has not been followed or cited
as controlling authority by a single court in the six years since it was decided. For
our purposes, it is important as an illustration of the EC's vision of what
exceptions would be allowed under Article 13. By conflating injury through
competition with injury through criticism, the court, as would the EC, allows
copyright holders to censor unfavorable uses of their work solely because they are
unfavorable. While the Ninth Circuit's decision can be dismissed as an improper
exercise of judicial power, the EC's contention is more perplexing, especially in
light of recent developments in the EC and scholarship about its own copyright
laws.
130. Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1403.
131. Id.
132. Compare id. with Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (upholding the
"distinction between potentially remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement").
133. Dr. Suess, 109 F.3d at 1403.
134. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 591.
135. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 78, at 318.
2005
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
IV. COPYRIGHT IN THE EC: A MOVEMENT TOWARD FREE EXPRESSION?
In the United Kingdom, courts are unlikely to decide that a work infringes a
copyright unless a substantial part of the work was used and the injury is to more
than the owner's amour propre (i.e., there is economic injury). 36 Spanish law
explicitly exempts parody from infringement so long as there is no risk of
confusion and it "does not harm the original work or its author.' 37 Likewise, the
Netherlands allows parody when its aim is "humour and not competition."' 38 In
France, where authors' rights are historically strongest,139 parody, pastiche, and
caricature are put together in one exception that applies so long as the work is
humorous, does not cause confusion with the original, and does not aim to injure or
degrade the original author.
140
This brief survey shows that some degree of protection for parodic uses is
already fairly common in EC member states. However, these protections are based
exclusively on internal limitations in copyright law, that is, specific statutory
limitations written into the copyright laws themselves; 14 1 no external limits to
copyright have traditionally been recognized. This is in sharp contrast to the
United States where internal limitations are provided by statute but external
limitations, such as the fair use exception for parody, even when codified are
essentially left to the courts to shape. 142  Of course the resistance to external
exceptions in Europe is fairly unsurprising. Europeans have historically
considered copyright an "unrestricted natural right"'143 which codified the "sacred
bond" between the author and his or her work.'"4 The primacy given to authors'
rights (also called moral rights) has kept them above the fray and without external
limitation. However, recent developments suggest this may be changing.
In order to implement the copyright exception provisions of TRIPs, a
European Directive was recently issued which aimed to harmonize the copyright
laws of the various EC member states. 145 The Directive explicitly allows those
states to provide for exceptions to copyright for "caricature, parody or pastiche.' 46
In addition, recent scholarship demonstrates that European courts have begun
entertaining (if not yet allowing) citizens' invocation of the free expression
136. Gredley & Maniatis,, supra note 73, at 341-42.
137. Id. at 144 (citing L. Gimeno, A Parody of Songs, [1997] ENT. LR 18).
138. Rowling v. Uitgeverij Byblos BV, 12003] E.C.D.R. 23, 2003 WL 21729296 at *250.
139. P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, in EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 343,
357 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
140. Id. (citing M. ROSE, PARODY: ANCIENT, MODERN AND POST-MODERN 92 (1993)).
141. Id., at 352.
142. Id. at 352-53.
143. Id. at 344.
144. Id. This is in sharp contrast to the "utilitarian" approach taken in the United States (and other
common law jurisdictions), where copyright is explicitly protected "to promote science and the useful
arts." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also id. at 352.
145. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art.
5(3)(a), 2001 O.J. (L167).
146. Id. art. 5(3)(k).
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provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950147 ("ECHR") as
defenses to copyright infringement. 148 Although EC courts have not traditionally
recognized the horizontal application of fundamental rights, 149 this would allow
citizens to invoke such rights as defenses against the actions of other citizens as
well as those of the state.' 50 Such invocations would allow parodists and other
would-be infringers an external defense to infringement. 151
After studying several recent ECHR and EC member state court decisions, P.
Bernt Hugenholtz has suggested that:
[In the future,] freedom of expression arguments are likely to succeed against
copyright claims aimed at preventing political discourse, curtailing journalistic
or artistic freedoms, suppressing publication of government-produced
information or impeding other forms of 'public speech' ... The [European]
Court might also be willing to find national copyright laws in direct
contravention of Article 10 [of the ECHR] if they fail to provide exceptions for
uses such as parody.1
5 2
No case has yet been presented that has required an EC court to squarely
decide the status of parody under the ECHR, but if these predictions are accurate
and the general trend toward recognizing external limitations on copyright in the
EC continues, it would be surprising if the EC did not find some free speech
protections for parodic use. It would be even more surprising if, in so finding, the
EC did not adopt a doctrine not unlike the U.S. fair use doctrine, which they had
attacked under TRIPs. In fact, in light of the Panel's interpretation of the copyright
exception provisions of TRIPs, were the EC to refuse to allow for exceptions for
non-competitive parodies, it may well be the EC's laws that are challenged under
the same provisions. Further, in light of the historical resistance to external
limitations in the EC, codifying (that is, making into an internal exception) the
distinction between market harm by criticism and market harm by competition
may well be a good first step toward implementing free speech exceptions to
copyright in the EC.
CONCLUSION
As an illustration of the dangers involved in allowing copyright owners to use
their rights to quiet those that would be critical of their work, one copyright scholar
offers the case of the successful "international copyright campaign of the Church
of Scientology."'5 3 Suits brought in various jurisdictions worldwide attempted to
stop former members of the "Church" from disseminating its writings in an effort
to discredit it.'5 4 While each challenged use consisted of verbatim reproductions of
147. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
148. See Bimhack, Acknowledging the Conflict, supra note 108, at 30.
149. Hugenholtz, supra note 140, at 345.
150. Id.
151. See Birnhack, Acknowledging the Conflict, supra note 108, at 30.
152. Hugenholtz, supra note 140, at 362 (emphasis added).
153. Bimhack, Acknowledging the Conflict, supra note 108, at 30.
154. See, e.g., New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1990).
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the works, the question of how the courts of various jurisdictions would have
decided the dispute had less of the work been used, though still in a manner which
was critical and aimed solely to discredit the "Church," remains unresolved. In
such cases, where free speech and copyright collide, recourse to or avoidance of
the competition/criticism dichotomy could be decisive.155 Copyright is meant to
protect the authors' and artists' economic interests in their works. However, this
policy is not furthered by allowing authors and artists to silence voices that are
critical of their works solely because such dissent may affect the popularity of
those works; quite to the contrary, in such a case, rather than being the engine of
free speech, copyright becomes, again, a tool of censorship.
155. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Vosper, 2 Q.B. 84, 94 (C.A. 1971) (Lord Denning, M.R.) (reasoning that
an injunction on the publication of a critical work that used passages of Scientology literature should be
removed by suggesting that in considering whether a use is an infringement or a "fair dealing," judges
should consider, et al, "the use made of [the original and the quoting work]. If they are used as a basis
for comment, criticism or review, that may be fair dealing. If they are used to convey the same
information as the author, for a rival purpose, that may be unfair.").
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